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We study, in the context of quantum information and quantum communication, a configuration
of devices that includes (1) a source of some unknown bipartite quantum state that is claimed to be
the Bell state Φ+ and (2) two spatially separated but otherwise unknown measurement apparatus,
one on each side, that are each claimed to execute an orthogonal measurement at an angle θ ∈
{−pi/8, 0, pi/8} that is chosen by the user. We show that, if the nine distinct probability distributions
that are generated by the self checking configuration, one for each pair of angles, are consistent with
the specifications, the source and the two measurement apparatus are guaranteed to be identical
to the claimed specifications up to a local change of basis on each side. We discuss the connection
with quantum cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Typically, when one considers the task of testing a
quantum system, for example using quantum state to-
mography, one makes the assumption that the measure-
ment apparatus are perfect or reasonably close to perfect.
Moreover, it is typically assumed that every measured
system has the correct dimension. In contrast, here we
consider the problem of testing a quantum system with-
out trusting the measuring apparatus that are used in
the test, except the fact that two measurements that are
space like separated in the ideal specification can be mod-
eled in the real setting by two silmutaneous quantum op-
erators on distinct systems. In particular, we assume no
apriori information about the dimension of the measured
systems or on the rank of the measurement operators.
The intuition that applies to ordinary tests where the
dimensions are correct does not apply here. The prob-
lem that we have is more difficult. In fact, it will already
be an interesting challenge to consider the case where the
probability distribution for measurement outcomes in the
real setting are identical to the corresponding probability
distributions in the ideal specification.
To be more specific, we describe the setting that
we will consider. The source has specification to emit
two systems (say photons) A and B in the Bell state
Φ+ = (|00〉AB + |11〉AB)/√2. The photons A and
B are sent to two measuring apparatus, one for each
photon, that respectively receive the classical inputs
α, β ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8} that represent the measurement
bases { |α+0〉, |α+π/2〉 } and { |β+0〉, |β+π/2〉 }. The
photons A and B are respectively measured in the bases
α and β and the respective classical outcomes x and y of
these measurements are noted on each side.
Let p((α, x), (β, y)) be the probability of the pair of
outcomes (x, y) given the pair of measurements (α, β)
when the system respects perfectly the original specifica-
tion. Let p˜((α, x), (β, y)) be the corresponding probabili-
ties for the actual system which might not be built to the
orginal specification. Let Θ = {−π/8, 0, π/8}×{0, 1}, the
space of pairs (α, x) where α is a basis and x an associated
outcome. Our main result states that if, ∀(a, b) ∈ Θ2, we
have p˜(a, b) = p(a, b), the setting is neccessarily identical
modulo some local isomorphisms (see section III) to the
original specification. This result would not be surprising
at all if we assumed that the two measured systems are
two dimensional systems or that the measurement opera-
tors are executed on two dimensional systems, but we do
not use any assumption of this kind here. No assumption
on the measuring apparatus or the source are required in
our proof of the theorem, except that before a measuring
apparatus receives its choice of basis and until after the
measurement is executed, the apparatus (and whatever
has selected the basis) is isolated from the other measur-
ing apparatus. In the specific context of quantum key
distribution, this separation assumption is also needed
after the measurement to guarantee the privacy of the
generated key, but this is another issue. If we only worry
about testing the source, we only need the separation as-
sumption until after the test is executed. This separation
assumption is only an assumption on the device or mech-
anism that is used to isolate the measuring apparatus; it
is not a direct assumption on the measuring apparatus.
If the actual system is not built to the original specifi-
cation, we might have p˜(a, b) 6= p(a, b). A test could even-
tually be executed to check how close the probabilities
p˜(a, b) are to the ideal case p(a, b). A robust variation on
the theorem should consider the case |p˜(a, b)−p(a, b)| ≤ ǫ,
but we do not do this analysis. The problem and the
main theorem are described in section III. A specific
connection with the BB84 protocol [2] in quantum cryp-
tography is discussed in section IV. Finally, the proof of
the theorem is provided in section V.
II. RELATED RESULTS
The result is interesting from both a purely theoreti-
cal point of view and a practical point of view. We hope
that it will have application in different areas of quantum
information processing. The result was obtained in a spe-
cific context, the unconditional security [1] of a variation
on a protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
[2]. For concreteness, we first explain this (variation on
2the) protocol. In this protocol, Alice sends many photons
to Bob in one of the four polarisation states |α+ xπ/2〉,
α ∈ {−π/8, π/8}, x ∈ {0, 1}. Usually, in the literature,
the bases are at angles are 0 and π/4 instead of −π/8
and π/8 as we have here, but this is symmetrical. Bob
measures each received photon in one of these two bases
chosen uniformly at random and notes the outcome y.
Let Ω be the set of positions where Alice and Bob used
the same basis. For each postion in Ω, because Alice and
Bob used the same basis, in principle they should share
the same bit x = y. After the quantum transmission,
Alice and Bob announce their bases, and therefore they
learn the set Ω. Eve also learns the bases used by Al-
ice, but it is too late for Eve because the photons are
already on Bob’s side. Alice and Bob execute a test on
a subset T ⊆ Ω and count the number of errors in T . If
too many errors are detected the test fails and the pro-
tocol aborts. Otherwise, the set T is thrown away and
the protocol continues. Alice announces redundant bits
about E = Ω − T and Bob uses this extra information
to correct the errors in E. At this point, Alice and Bob
should share a string of bits on E which we call the raw
key. Eve has obtained some information about the raw
key from the redundant information or directly because
she eavesdropped on the quantum channel. To address
this problem, Alice and Bob generate a final key k in
which each bit ki is the parity of some subset Ki ⊆ E
of the raw key bits, a well known technique to extract a
final key from the raw key [3]. As proven in [1], if the
number of parity bits is not too large, the final key will
be almost perfectly secret, that is, with almost certainty
either the test fails or Eve has almost no information
about the final key. The connection between this proof
and our result is given in section IV.
The novelty of the problem that we consider is that the
apparatus that are used in the protocol can be defective.
There is no perfect solution to this problem. Therefore,
every tool that can be used to improve the situation is
normally welcome and our theorem is such a tool. Be-
fore we explain in which way our theorem helps, let us
describe the basic steps that should be taken even be-
fore we use this theorem. The first basic step is simply
to propose assumptions that directly say that the source
is close to the ideal specification. The second basic step
is to justified each of these assumptions (as much as an
assumption can be) by considering the specific technol-
ogy used. An example of such a direct assumption is an
upper-bound on the ratio of multi-photon signal that is
emitted by a source. In this case, the required technology
could be a strong signal of light followed by an attenua-
tor. The intensity of the strong signal is measured and
then the attenuator is used to reduce the intensity of the
signal to the desired level. It turns out that this specific
technology is reasonably trusted. In the same way, a di-
rect assumption must be proposed and justified for every
degree of freedom which can encode information. In addi-
tion to the photon number space, one has to consider the
frequency space, the polarization space and also we must
consider the possibility that the information gets encoded
into a different system. For example, if any mechanical
system is used, the information could get encoded into
some vibrational modes. Moreover, one should explain
(in the general model of quantum mechanics) why all as-
pects are covered by the proposed assumptions. So the
task is not easy and it is not a perfect solution.
Some people might say that these assumptions should
not be trusted, and a test should be conducted to ver-
ify them instead. For example, one might propose to
use a photon detector to test the intensity of the signal
after the attenuator. Fine, but this leads us to our com-
plementary approach. The immediate problem that we
must address is that validity of the test depends on the
testing apparatus, the photon detector. Let us consider
what can be done. In 1991, Artur Ekert proposed a pro-
tocol that was based on EPR pairs and violation of a Bell
inequality [4]. Though the security analysis of his pro-
tocol was incomplete, Ekert‘s salient idea of using EPR
pairs and violation locality in a protocol is far reaching.
First, if the parties on both sides have trusted measuring
apparatus, the idea of using an untrusted source of EPR
pairs takes care of the defective EPR source issue by itself
(without any use of violation of locality). Ekert’s analysis
considered the case in which we have perfect measuring
apparatus. A little bit later, it was strongly suggested in
[6] that violation of a Bell inequality (which is more than
just using EPR pairs) does not help in quantum cryp-
tography unless the purpose is to verify the quantum
apparatus. In the context of trusted quantum appara-
tus, violation of Bell like inequalities might not provide
better security. Moreover, to our knowledge, it didn’t
help as a theoretical tool to obtain a better bound on
Eve’s information. However, with violation of locality,
one can hope to test both a defective source and defec-
tive measuring apparatus. Ekert did not explicitly pro-
pose that we should use violation of locality to test both
the EPR source and the measuring apparatus, but the
idea was implicitly there. It was there, but remained un-
used until the work of [7] in which violation of locality
was used to test both the source and the measuring appa-
ratus (see also [11]). Two papers reported experimental
work that was based upon Ekert’s protocol (or a similar
protocol) [9, 10]. The purpose of some these papers was
to address the imperfect apparatus issue. They cite Ek-
ert for his protocol. However, nobody knows if Ekert’s
protocol meets the objective. Even Ekert did not claim
that. His main focus was not to test defective apparatus.
There are other connections between quantum cryptog-
raphy and violation of locality or Bell inequalities that
focus less on testing defective apparatus than the current
paper does, but are not less interesting [12].
This paper, following [7], shows that, except for the
location of each apparatus and the time at which they
receive their input, we can assume that Eve has designed
both the EPR source and the detectors. In practice, to
conduct a test on the source, we also need the assumption
that the different executions of the overall configuration
3in the test are identical and independent. Our main tool
is violation of classical locality. In the context of un-
trusted source and untrusted measuring apparatus, it is
not clear whether or not a violation of a Bell inequal-
ity, especially if it is only sligthly violated, implies that
a private key can be generated. Therefore, in this con-
text, it is not sufficient to detect a violation of a Bell
inequality to claim that a protocol is secure. So, our
statement is not that violation of locality implies secu-
rity. We use violation of locality indirectly by considering
an ideal setting that is known to violate a Bell inequality
and by restricting ourselves to attacks that generate the
same probability distribution of classical outcomes as in
this ideal setting. Again, if the attack modifies the prob-
ability distribution of these classical outcomes, this can
be detected by Alice and Bob, but we do not do this part
of the analysis. Of course, this test will require its own
set of assumptions. This approach should not be taken as
a way to avoid the basic steps that are described above.
Instead, in view of the fact that no solution is perfect,
we think that the existence of two complementary ap-
proaches is very much welcome.
III. THE PROBLEM AND THE MAIN RESULT
An apparatus emits an unkown system A˜⊗ B˜ in some
unknown state ΨA˜B˜ which will be measured by some un-
known measurement operators ΠA˜a , Π
B˜
b associated with
a, b ∈ Θ, respectively. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that the source emits a pure state ΨA˜B˜. There is no
loss of generality because an extra system can be added to
A˜ or B˜ to purify the state. Without loss of generality, we
can further assume that the defective measurement op-
erators ΠA˜a and Π
B˜
b respectively associated with a and b
are orthogonal. An auxiliary system in some known state
can be added to the measured system to replace a general
POVM on this system by an orthogonal measurement on
the extended system [15]. The ideal projection on the sys-
tem A (B) associated with an element a ∈ Θ (b ∈ Θ) is
denoted PAa (P
B
b ). We define p(a, b) = ‖PAa ⊗PBb |Φ+AB〉‖2
and p˜(a, b) = ‖ΠA˜aΠB˜b |ΨA˜B˜〉‖2.
As we explained in the Introduction, the hypothesis
in our main result (theorem 1) are p˜(a, b) = p(a, b),
ΠA˜a = P
A˜
a ⊗ IB˜ and ΠB˜b = IA˜ ⊗ P B˜b . Different sys-
tems (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜) can generate the same probabili-
ties p˜(a, b). Let Aˆ (Bˆ) be the support of the residual
density matrix of ΨA˜B˜ after a partial trace over B˜ (A˜).
The definition of P A˜a and P
B˜
b outside Aˆ and Bˆ respec-
tively cannot affect the probabilities p˜(a, b). Therefore
the only constraint that we can hope to obtain on P A˜a
(P B˜b ) will have to be a constraint on P
Aˆ
a
def
= PAˆP
A˜
a PAˆ
(P Bˆb
def
= PBˆP
B˜
b PBˆ), where PAˆ (PBˆ) is the projection on
the subspace Aˆ (Bˆ) of A˜ (B˜). Our result takes this fact
into account.
Another point is that the defective system A˜ (the same
for B˜) might not contain any qubit, that is, there might
not exist any qubit A such that, for some other compo-
nent EA, we have A˜ = A⊗EA. A unitary transformation
on A˜ can correspond to a change of basis in A˜, but it will
not create a qubit because of the trivial fact that the
final space is still A˜. If the space A˜ already had a ten-
sor product structure, a unitary transformation on this
space could change a pure state into an entangled state,
and this could be interpreted as a modification of the ten-
sor product structure of the state but not of the space.
If the space A˜ has no tensor product structure, a unitary
transformation on A˜ will not create one. In opposition,
we would like to conclude that somehow the subspace Aˆ
(Bˆ) of the defective systems A˜ (B˜) contains the correct
qubit A (B). One solution is simply to add an extra qubit
A (B) initially in the state |0〉A (|0〉B) and then consider
a local unitary transformation defined on A⊗ Aˆ (B⊗ Bˆ)
that will extract the information about the correct qubits
in Aˆ (Bˆ) and swap it into A (B). Another formal solu-
tion is to consider an isometry from Aˆ to A ⊗ EA. An
isometry is the same as an unitary transformation except
that it can change the tensor product structure because
the final space is not the same as the initial space.
Definition 1 A linear transformation U from a space V
to a space W is an isometry if and only if V and W have
the same dimension and U preserves the inner product
between any pair of states in V .
Theorem 1 For every setting (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜) such that
p˜(a, b) = p(a, b), P A˜a acts on A˜ only and P
B˜
b acts on
B˜ only, there exists two “garbage” spaces EA and EB ,
a state ΨEAEB ∈ EA ⊗ EB , an isometry UAˆ from Aˆ to
A⊗EA and an isometry UBˆ from Bˆ to B⊗EB such that,
• for every a ∈ Θ, UAˆP Aˆa U †Aˆ = (PAa ⊗ IEA),
• for every b ∈ Θ, UBˆP Bˆb U †Bˆ = (PBb ⊗ IEB ),
• (UAˆ ⊗ UBˆ)ΨA˜B˜ = (Φ+AB ⊗ΨEAEB ).
This theorem essentially states that the real system
is identical to the ideal system ((PBb ⊗ IEB ), (PAa ⊗
IEA),Φ
+
AB ⊗ΨEAEB ) up to a local change of basis (that
can modify the tensor product structure) on each side.
The system ((PBb ⊗IEB ), (PAa ⊗IEA),Φ+AB⊗ΨEAEB ) fol-
lows exactly the original specification except for an addi-
tional system EA⊗EB that is in some pure state ΨEAEB
which doesn’t interfer at all with this specification. One
cannot hope to prove more than theorem 1 using only
p˜a(x) = pa(x). The proof will be given in section V.
IV. CONNECTION WITH THE BB84
PROTOCOL
There are different ways in which our main result could
be connected to a security proof. In particular, our self-
4checking apparatus can be used in the BB84 protocol in
two different ways. In one way, the two measuring appa-
ratus in our self-checking apparatus are on Alice’s side.
This is the approach that we will describe here. It corre-
sponds to the original idea of a self-checking source en-
tirely located on Alice’s side. The other approach is that
the two measuring apparatus are respectively located on
Alice’s side and on Bob’s side. We will not discuss this
other option here.
We recall that we consider a variation on the BB84
protocol where every state is rotated of an angle −π/8
so that the bases used are at angle −π/8 and π/8 instead
of 0 and π/4 as is usually the case in the literature. When
Alice picks α = {−π/8, π/8} for the measurement on the
first photon and obtains the outcome x, the second pho-
ton collapses into the state |α+xπ/2〉, as requested in the
BB84 protocol. However, our test requires that Alice uses
the three angles −π/8, 0 and π/8 for the two photons.
Therefore, to test the apparatus Alice will pick a random
set of positions R and the bases α, β ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8} for
the positions in this set. For the non tested positions (i.e.
the positions not in R), Alice will use α ∈ {−π/8, π/8}
for the first photon and send the other photon to Bob.
The basic intuition is that, if the test really works, it
should be unlikely that this test succeeds on R and would
fail if it was executed outside R.
Let us prove that, whenever the source respect the con-
clusion of theorem 1, the protocol is as secure as if an
ordinary BB84 source was used. It is convenient to con-
sider UAˆ ⊗ UBˆ as a change of bases which provides an
alternative representation for the states of the subsystem
Aˆ ⊗ Bˆ. In this alternative representation, it is not hard
to see that if (α, x) is used/obtained on A’s side, the sys-
tem B ⊗ EA ⊗ EB must be left in the collapsed state
|α + xπ/2〉 ⊗ ΨEAEB . If we return to the original repre-
sentation, the collapsed state is (UAˆ⊗UBˆ)|α+xπ/2〉A⊗
|α + xπ/2〉B ⊗ ΨEAEB . The transformation UAˆ has no
effect on B˜’s side, so it’s the same thing as if Eve received
the part B⊗EB of UBˆ|a1+ x1π/2〉H2 ⊗ΨEAEB . An im-
portant fact is that UBˆ and ΨEAEB are independent of α
and x. Therefore, with the state |α+xπ/2〉B and the part
EB of the state ΨEAEB Eve could herself create the state
UBˆ|α + xπ/2〉B ⊗ ΨEAEB . Therefore, Eve has nothing
more than what she could obtain if the ordinary BB84
source was used together with a completely uncorrelated
state ΨEAEB that is initially shared between Alice and
Bob.
V. THE PROOF
Here we prove the main result (theorem 1). Theorem
1 is given in terms of two local isometries UAˆ and UBˆ
which preserve the tensor product structure of the sub-
space Aˆ⊗ Bˆ of A˜⊗ B˜. We will also need a simpler notion
of isomorphism which ignores the tensor product struc-
ture of the space A˜ ⊗ B˜. If we do not care about the
tensor product structure, there is a smaller space which
contains ΨA˜B˜ and this space is sufficient to describe the
essential of the projections P A˜a and P
B˜
b . This space is
the span S of {(P A˜a ⊗ P B˜b )ΨA˜B˜ | a, b ∈ Θ}.
Definition 2 Consider any setting (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜). The
setting (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜) is inner product isomorph to
(PAa , P
B
b ,Φ
+
AB) if there exists an isometry U from the
span S of {(P A˜a ⊗ P B˜b )ΨA˜B˜ | a, b ∈ Θ} to A ⊗ B such
that, for every a, b ∈ Θ, for every |φS〉 ∈ S, we have
A1: (P A˜a ⊗ P B˜b )|φS〉 = U †(PAa ⊗ PBb )U |φS〉 and
A2: UΨA˜B˜ = Φ
+
AB.
The proof of theorem 1 proceeds in two main steps.
First, we prove that the equality p˜(a, b) = p(a, b) im-
plies that (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜) is inner product isomorph to
(PAa , P
B
b ,Φ
+
AB). Second, we show that this isomorphism
implies the conclusion of theorem 1. The reader might
find the second step a little bit surprising because S, the
span of {(P A˜a ⊗ P B˜b )ΨA˜B˜ | a, b ∈ Θ}, is not necessarily
identical to Aˆ⊗ Bˆ. In fact, S is not in general the tensor
product of two Hilbert spaces. As we will see, the trick
is that the inner product structure Aˆ ⊗ Bˆ can be recon-
structed because the projections P A˜a and P
B˜
b are defined
on A˜ and B˜ separately.
A. The inner product isomorphism.
Throughout this subsection we assume that the
equality p˜(a, b) = p(a, b) hold and we try to show
that (P B˜b , P
A˜
a ,ΨA˜B˜) is inner product isomorph to
(PAa , P
B
b ,Φ
+
AB). We have 6 possible values for a (3 bases
with 2 outcomes each) and 6 possible values for b, so a to-
tal of 36 possible (non normalised) states (P A˜a ⊗P B˜b )ΨA˜B˜.
If our goal can be achieved, these 36 vectors should lie
in a 4 dimensional space and be linearly related as in
the ideal specification. For every α ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8}, let
Θα = {(α, 0), (α, 1)}. To achieve our goal we have that
the lenght of these vectors are uniquely determined by
the probabilities p(a, b). We also have that, for every
α ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8}, ∑a∈Θα P A˜a = I,
∑
b∈Θα
P B˜b = I,
and also the commutativity of P A˜a and P
B˜
b . The proof of
the inner product isomorphism proceeds in three steps.
In the first step, we show the following simple proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 For every a ∈ Θ,
P A˜a P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜ = P
B˜
a P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜ = P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜ = P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜.
In the second step, we show this other simple proposition.
Proposition 2 For every (α, β) ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8} with
α 6= β, the four non normalised vectors in B(α,β) def=
5{P A˜a P B˜b ΨA˜B˜ | a ∈ Θα, b ∈ Θβ}, are orthogonal and
have the same length as the corresponding ideal vectors
PAa P
B
b Ψ
+
AB.
Each of these 6 different sets B(α,β) of 4 vectors span a
4 dimensional space. The third and crucial step is to
show that, for every (α, β) and (α′, β′) with α 6= β and
α′ 6= β′, the four vectors in B(α,β) are linearly related to
the four vectors in Bα′,β′ with the same coefficients as for
the corresponding vectors in the ideal specification. More
precisely, we must show the following crucial proposition.
Proposition 3 For every (α, β) and (α′, β′) with α 6= β
and α′ 6= β′, for every (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2,
P A˜(α,x)P
B˜
(β,y)ψA˜B˜
=
∑
(x′,y′)∈{0,1}
[T
(α′,β′)
(α,β) ]
(x′,y′)
(x,y) P
A˜
(α′,x′)P
B˜
(β′,y′)ψA˜B˜
where [T
(α′,β′)
(α,β) ] is the unique 4×4 coefficient matrix such
that
PA(α,x)P
B
(β,y)Φ
+
=
∑
(x′,y′)∈{0,1}
[T
(α′,β′)
(α,β) ]
(x′,y′)
(x,y) P
A
(α′,x′)P
B
(β′,y′)Φ
+
AB.
It is not hard to see that proposition 3 implies that
the mapping that maps P A˜a P
B˜
b ΨA˜B˜ into P
A
a P
B
b Φ
+
AB, for
a, b ∈ Θ0 = {(0, 0), (0, 1)}, is an inner product isomor-
phism (see definition 2). Indeed, proposition 3 implies
that any of the 6 sets B(α,β) is a (non normalised) basis
for S that is as good as any other basis to check if a pro-
jection P A˜a P
B˜
b has the correct matrix representation. So,
to check P A˜a P
B˜
b , one simply picks the basis B(α,β) that
contains P A˜a P
B˜
b ΨA˜B˜.
Note that proposition 2 consider 24 vectors, and we
said that there are 36 outcomes. This can be explained
by two facts. First, the probabilities are the same in the
real setting as in the ideal setting and, thus, 6 of these
vectors vanish because their associated outcome occurs
with probability zero: for every α ∈ {−π/8, 0, π/8}
P A˜(α,0)P
B˜
(α,1)ΨA˜B˜ = P
A˜
(α,1)P
B˜
(α,0)ΨA˜B˜ = 0. (1)
This brings us back to 30 vectors. Second, proposition
1 says that the 6 non vanishing vectors P A˜a P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜ =
P B˜a P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜ , a ∈ Θ, can be written as P A˜a ΨA˜B˜ or P B˜a ΨA˜B˜
and thus are known linear combinations of the 24 vectors
considered in proposition 2. Now, we prove proposition 1.
Proof of proposition 1. We have P A˜a P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜ =
P B˜a ΨA˜B˜ because the collapse associated with the projec-
tion P A˜a on P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜ occurs with probability 1. Similarly,
P B˜a P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜ = P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜. By commutativity, we obtain
P B˜a P
A˜
a ΨA˜B˜ = P
A˜
a P
B˜
a ΨA˜B˜. By transitivity, we obtain
proposition 1b. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 2. The orthogonality of the four
vectors P A˜a P
B˜
b ΨA˜B˜, a ∈ Θα and b ∈ Θβ, is immediate
from the fact that P A˜(α,0) is orthogonal to P
A˜
(α,1), P
B˜
(β,0) is
orthogonal to P B˜(β,1) and the commutativity of P
A˜
a and
P B˜b . The length of the vector P
A˜
a P
B˜
b ΨA˜B˜ is the same
as in the ideal specification because it is uniquely deter-
mined by the probability p˜(a, b) = p(a, b). 
Now, we proceed with the third step which we feel is the
most importany step of the entire proof.
Proof of proposition 3. Here is a crucial observation
for the proof. Let (α, γ, β) be either (−π/8, 0, π/8),
(0, π/8,−π/8) or (π/8,−π/8, 0): a cyclic permutation
of (−π/8, 0, π/8). In this way, the value of β ∈
{−π/8, 0, π/8} uniquely determines α and γ. In the spec-
ified setting, if we use a fixed basis β and a fixed outcome
z on one side, say the side B˜, and look at the different fi-
nal states associated with the two different bases α and γ
and the two different outcomes 0 and 1 on the other side,
we see that the 4 different final states lie in the same
real two dimensional plane. This fact is easily under-
stood because the system on the non fixed side is a two
dimensional system and the states in the measurement
bases are all in the same real plane (no complex num-
bers). Two of these four states belong to B(α,β) whereas
the two others belong to B(γ,β).
Note that states that have different value of z are or-
thogonal. So, the linear relationship between B(α,β) and
B(γ,β) does not mix different values of z: the coefficient
[T
(α,β)
(γ,β) ]
(x′,z′)
(x,z) vanishes when z 6= z′. Therefore, it is suffi-
cient to see, for each value of z individually, how the two
states associated with (γ, β) and z (below the dotted line
in figure 1) are linearly related to the two states associ-
ated (α, β) and z (above the dotted line in figure 1). For
z = 0, 1, let
d(β,z) = (P
A˜
(α,0)P
B˜
(β,z) − P A˜(γ,0)P B˜(β,z))ΨA˜B˜.
It is not hard to algebrically check, with the help of
proposition 1, that the length of
dβ
def
= d(β,0) + d(β,1) = (P
A˜
(α,0) − P A˜(γ,0))ΨA˜B˜
is uniquely determined by the probabilities p˜(a, b) =
p(a, b). Indeed, we have
〈ΨA˜B˜|(P A˜(α,0) − P A˜(γ,0))(P A˜(α,0) − P A˜(γ,0))|ΨA˜B˜〉
= ‖P A˜(α,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉‖2 − 〈ΨA˜B˜|P A˜(γ,0)P A˜(α,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉
−〈ΨA˜B˜|P A˜(α,0)P A˜(γ,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉+ ‖P A˜(γ,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉‖2
and
〈ΨA˜B˜|P A˜(γ,0)P A˜(α,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉 = 〈ΨA˜B˜|P A˜(γ,0)P B˜(α,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉
= ‖P A˜(γ,0)P B˜(α,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉‖2,
6and similarly for the term 〈ΨA˜B˜|P A˜(α,0)P A˜(γ,0)|ΨA˜B˜〉. We
also have that the two states d(β,0) and d(β,1) are orthog-
onal because they have different value of z. So, we have
obtained
‖d(β,0)‖2 + ‖d(β,1)‖2 = ‖dβ‖2
= ‖didealβ ‖2
= ‖dideal(β,0)‖2 + ‖dideal(β,1)‖2. (2)
After an exhaustive consideration of all cases, one can
check that in the ideal specification we have that either,
for both z = 0 and z = 1, PA(α,0)P
B
(β,z)Φ
+ is on the same
side of the dotted line (see figure 1) as PA(γ,0)P
B
(β,z)Φ
+
AB or
else, for both z = 0 and z = 1, PA(α,0)P
B
(β,z)Φ
+ is on a dif-
ferent side of the dotted line than PA(γ,0)P
B
(β,z)Φ
+
AB. This
means that either both ‖dideal(β,0)‖2 and ‖dideal(β,1)‖2 reach their
maximum value or else they both reach their minimum
value. So, we have the following.
‖d(β,z)‖2 ≤ ‖dideal(β,0)‖2 (∀z ∈ {0, 1})
or (3)
‖d(β,z)‖2 ≥ ‖dideal(β,0)‖2 (∀z ∈ {0, 1})
If we combine (2) and (3), we obtain ‖d(β,0)‖2 = ‖dideal(β,0)‖2
and ‖d(β,1)‖2 = ‖dideal(β,1)‖2. So, the real setting reaches the
same extreme situation as in the ideal setting where the
coefficients [T
(α,β)
(γ,β) ]
(x′,z′)
(x,z) are uniquely determined. This
shows that the transformation [T
(α,β)
(γ,β) ]
(x′,z′)
(x,z) is the same
as in the ideal case.
Now, we must consider arbitrary transformation from
B(α,β) to B(α′,β′), not just from B(α,β) to B(γ,β). By
symmetry, we also have the transformations from B(α,β)
to B(α,γ), that is, we can also change the basis on the
side B˜ while keeping the same basis on the side A˜.
For any (α, β), (α′, β′) and (α′′, β′′), the transformation
from B(α,β) to B(α′′,β′′) is the product of the transfor-
mation from B(α,β) to B(α′,β′) with the transformation
from B(α′,β′) to B(α′′,β′′). Using this fact, it is easy to
obtain all transformations from an arbitrary set B(α,β)
to an arbitrary set B(α′,β′). This concludes the proof. 
B. The tensor product structure
Here, we use the result of the previous subsection to
prove theorem 1. We want to construct two local isome-
tries UAˆ and UBˆ that respects the three conditions of
theorem 1. Intuitively, the isometry UAˆ will extract the
information about the correct qubit that is hidden in-
side Aˆ, and leave Aˆ (without this information) as the
garbage space. It will swap the state of a correct qubit
that is somehow hidden in Aˆ with the state of an addi-
tional qubit A that is initially in state |0〉. This is just
an intuition.
Formally, we will only show how to obtain UAˆ because
UBˆ can be obtained in the same way with an additional
qubit B that is initially in the state |0〉B. For two qubits
A′ and A, let us denote
→
NAA′ the control not operation
where A is the source qubit and A′ the target qubit.
Similarly, let us denote
←
NAA′ the control not operation
where A′ is the source and A is the target. Let NA and
NA′ be the not operation on A and A
′, respectively. One
can easily check that
→
NAA′= P
A
(0,0) ⊗ IA′ + PA(0,1) ⊗NA′ (4)
←
NAA′= IA ⊗ PA
′
(0,0) +NA ⊗ PA
′
(0,1), (5)
and
NA/A′ =
√
2(P
A/A′
(pi/8,0) − P
A/A′
(−pi/8,0)). (6)
Note that
→
NAA′
←
NAA′ is the standard swap operation on
A ⊗ A′ given that A is initially in the state |0〉A. This
suggests that we define the swap operation on A⊗ Aˆ as
UAAˆ
def
=
→
NAAˆ
←
NAAˆ (7)
where the extended control not operations
→
NAAˆ and
←
NAAˆ, by analogy with (4), (5) and (6), are defined as
→
NAAˆ
def
= PA(0,0) ⊗ IAˆ + PA(0,1) ⊗NAˆ (8)
and
←
NAAˆ
def
= IA ⊗ P Aˆ(0,0) +NA ⊗ P A˜(0,1) (9)
where
NAˆ
def
=
√
2(P Aˆ(pi/8,0) − P Aˆ(−pi/8,0)).
The swap operation UBBˆ can be defined in a similar way.
We recall that the span of {(P A˜a ⊗P B˜b )ΨA˜B˜ | a, b ∈ Θ}
is denoted as S. Let us show that that, for every ΦS ∈ S,
for every |a〉A ∈ A, we have
(UAAˆ ⊗ IBˆ)(|a〉A ⊗ ΦS) (10)
= (IA ⊗ U †)(
→
NAA′
←
NAA′ ⊗IB′)(IA ⊗ U)(|a〉A ⊗ ΦS)
where U is the inner product isomorphism from S to
A′ ⊗ B′. First, we use the definitions of UAAˆ,
→
N A˜A and
←
N A˜A respectively given in (7), (8) and (9) to expand
UAAˆ in the LHS in terms of the projections P
Aˆ
a and P
A
a .
Second, use the condition A1 of definition 2 for an inner
product isomorphism (summing over b ∈ Θ0 to get rid of
the projections P Bˆb ) to replace every projection P
Aˆ
a by its
corresponding projection PA
′
a . This also adds (IA ⊗ U †)
to the left and (IA ⊗ U) to the right. To finally obtain
7the RHS, we use the identities (4), (5) and (6) to recover
the expression (
→
NAA′
←
NAA′ ⊗IB′), but this time on A ⊗
A′ ⊗B′. We can obtain a similar result for UBBˆ.
With the help of (10) and condition A2 of the inner
product isomorphism, we can obtain
(UAAˆ ⊗ UBBˆ)|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B ⊗ΨA˜B˜ = Φ+AB ⊗ΨEAEB (11)
with
ΨEAEB = U
†(|0〉A′ ⊗ |0〉B′).
This is essentially the third condition of theorem 1. It is
not exactly the third condition because it is expressed in
terms of the swap operation UAAˆ and UBBˆ, not in terms
of isometries. The isometry UAˆ is simply the transforma-
tion UAAˆ where the space A is always in the fixed state
|0〉A so that the fixed component |0〉A does not need to
appear explicitly in the initial state. The image of UAˆ on
Aˆ is the image of UAAˆ on {|0〉A} ⊗ Aˆ. It is not hard to
see using (11) and proposition 4 (provided later) that the
image of UAˆ is A ⊗ EA where EA is the support of the
residual density matrix of ΨEAEB on Aˆ. The isometry UBˆ
can be defined in a similar way. With these definitions,
(11) becomes
(UAˆ ⊗ UBˆ)ΨA˜B˜ = Φ+AB ⊗ΨEAEB
which is exactly the third condition. With the help of
(10), as a first step toward the first condition, we can
obtain that, for every ΦS ∈ S ⊆ Aˆ⊗ Bˆ,
(P Aˆa ⊗ IBˆ)ΦS
= U †
Aˆ
(PAa ⊗ IAˆBˆ)UAˆΦS (12)
and similarly for the second condition for P Bˆb .
To conclude the proof, it only remains to show that
(UAˆ⊗IBˆ) does the right job on Aˆ⊗Bˆ, not only on S (i.e.,
UAˆ is an isometry and fully satisfied the first condition
of the theorem), and similarly with UBˆ (for the second
condition). The following easy to prove proposition is a
key ingredient.
Proposition 4 Let ΨXY be any entangled pure state of
a bipartite system X ⊗ Y . Let Xˆ be the support of the
residual density matrix of ΨXY on X. Let AX and A
′
X be
any two linear operators from Xˆ to another space Z. We
have that AXΨXY = A
′
XΨXY if and only if AX = A
′
X .
Moreover, the image of AX on Xˆ is the support of the
residual density matrix of AXΨXY on Z.
Proof. Consider a Schmidt decomposition
ΨXY =
∑
i∈X
λi|i〉X ⊗ |i〉Y
of ΨXY where λi > 0 for every i ∈ X . Consider
the projection P Yi = |i〉Y〈i| on Y . We have that
AXΨXY = A
′
XΨXY , if and only if, for every i ∈ X ,
P Yi AXΨXY = P
Y
i A
′
XΨXY which implies that, for ev-
ery i ∈ X , AX |i〉X ⊗ |i〉Y = A′X |i〉X ⊗ |i〉Y , and thus
AX |i〉X = A′X |i〉X . The image of AX on Xˆ is the span
of {AX |i〉X | i ∈ X}, but this is also the support of the
residual density matrix of AXΨXY on Z. 
We must show that UAˆ is an isometry from Aˆ to its im-
age (which we do not need to know here), and then check
that this isometry respects the first condition of theorem
1. To obtain that UAˆ is an isometry, it is sufficient to
obtain that U †
Aˆ
UAˆ is the identity on Aˆ. We can use the
definition of UAˆ in terms of the projections P
Aˆ
a and the
inner product isomorphism on S (as we did to obtain
(10)), but this time to obtain that U †
Aˆ
UAˆΨA˜B˜ = ΨA˜B˜
and then apply proposition 4 to conclude that U †
Aˆ
UAˆ is
the identity on Aˆ. Now, we verify the first condition of
theorem 1 in a similar way. We want to show that
P Aˆa = U
†
Aˆ
(PAa ⊗ IEA)UAˆ
on Aˆ. We simply use (12) with ΦS = ΨA˜B˜ and proposi-
tion 4. This concludes the proof of theorem 1.
VI. DISCUSSION
Thus far, this result was not generalised to a large
class of settings. Of course, if we only vary the angles
a little, it will still hold, but nothing is known for more
interesting variations. For example, it is still an open
question whether a similar result applies if we used the
angles {0, π/4} on one side and the angles {π/8,−π/8}
on the other side, instead of {π/8, 0,−π/8} on both sides.
Also, it is known that the GHZ state can also be self
tested [19], but no rule is known for a large class of states.
The theorem was obtained in the context of quantum
cryptography. It would be useful to obtain a robust vari-
ation on this theorem in which the probabilities do not
have to exactly respect the ideal specification. The idea is
that a statistical test could then be used to obtain enough
constraints on the source for the purpose of quantum
cryptography. One may also ask what are the implica-
tions of this result in the foundation of quantum mechan-
ics. Somehow, the essential processus of science is that
we try to figure out what specific models describe the
observed classical data in different settings. In particu-
lar, we make hypothesis and then conduct experiments to
verify them. This is essentially the situation that is anal-
ysed in our theorem. Therefore, it would be interesting
to see if the analysis of self-checking quantum appara-
tus says anything interesting about the way we build our
different quantum models. If there is a link, it is not a
trivial link because, typically, experimentalits know what
their measuring apparatus are when they verify a model
whereas our theorem applies when the measuring appa-
ratus on each side are not known. Finally, in view of
8the fact that configurations such as the one we consider
in our theorem have been studied for many years in the
context of violation of Bell’s inequalities, it is interesting
to know that they are uniquely determined (up to a nat-
ural isomorphism) by the probability distributions that
they generate.
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FIG. 1: The vector d(β,z) has maximum length when the
real plane spanned by P A˜(α,0)P
B˜
(β,z)ΨA˜B˜ and P
A˜
(α,1)P
B˜
(β,z)ΨA˜B˜
(above the dotted line) and the real plane spanned by
P A˜(γ,0)P
B˜
(β,z)ΨA˜B˜ and P
A˜
(γ,1)P
B˜
(β,z)ΨA˜B˜ (below the dotted line)
are one and the same plane.
